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VETTING SEXUAL OFFENDERS:
STATE OVER-EXTENSION, THE
PUNISHMENT DEFICIT AND THE
FAILURE TO MANAGE RISK
ANNE-MARIE MCALINDEN
Queen’s University Belfast, UK
ABSTRACT
This article examines the state regulation of sexual offenders in the particular context
of pre-employment vetting. A successive range of statutory frameworks have been
put in place, culminating in the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, to prevent
unsuitable individuals from working with the vulnerable, and children in particular.
Contemporary legislative and policy developments are set against a backdrop of
broader concerns in the area of crime and justice, namely risk regulation, preventative
governance and ‘precautionary logic’. Proponents of these approaches have largely
ignored concerns over their feasibility. This article specifically addresses this fissure
within the specific field of vetting. It is argued that ‘hyper innovation’ and state over-
extension in this area are particularly problematic and have resulted in exceptionally
uncertain and unsafe policies. These difficulties relate principally to unrealistic public
expectations about the state’s ability to control crime; unintended and ambiguous
policy effects; and ultimately the failure of the state to deliver on its self-imposed
regulatory mandate to effectively manage risk.
KEY WORDS
precautionary logic; risk; regulation; sex offenders; vetting
INTRODUCTION
POST-MODERN debates on security and justice have been classified by amarked emphasis on ‘regulation’ and ‘governance’. The new era of the‘regulatory state’ (Majone, 1994; Braithwaite, 2000; Moran, 2001), or the
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‘post-regulatory state’ (Black, 2001; Scott, 2004), as others prefer, has seen the
global emergence of a risk-based logic which has re-shaped the use of punish-
ment as a regulatory mechanism (Beck, 1992; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997;
Shearing, 2000). Scholars have highlighted contemporaneous developments
in the governance of anti-social behaviour and community safety within civil
society (Crawford, 1997, 2003), as well as policing or security in general
(Shearing, 2000; Loader and Walker, 2007), as useful illustrations of the
minutiae of state control of crime and disorder. This article will consider the
implications of these debates for the regulation of sex offenders in the United
Kingdom, particularly within the context of pre-employment vetting.
A distinguishing feature of contemporary trends in social regulation is what
has been termed ‘hyper innovation’ (Moran, 2003; Crawford, 2006) which
takes place against a backdrop of the overt politicization of deviant behaviour.
Over the last decade there has been unprecedented law and policy making in
the area of behavioural and social control. The 1997 Labour government,
under the banner of ‘New Labour’, was elected on a strong ‘law and order’
ticket reflecting Prime Minister Blair’s mantra, ‘tough on crime, tough on
the causes of crime’ (Tonry, 2003). Between 1997 and 2005, over 1000 new
criminal offences were created within 43 crime-related pieces of legislation
(Crawford, 2006: 457). These figures are indicative of what Lacey (2004) calls
‘criminalisation as regulation’, where the state attempts to assert its author-
ity via the imposition of a burgeoning amount of criminal sanctions.
There has been an increasing emphasis on notions of ‘risk’ and ‘regulation’
for a minority of criminals for whom exceptional forms of punishment and
control are thought necessary (Zedner, 2009). Such authoritarianism has
resulted in the marginalization and criminalization of targeted deviant groups
(Scraton, 2004), including sex offenders. The state’s prioritization of the
dangers posed by potential sex offenders over other forms of deviant behav-
iour is driven in large part by media-fuelled popular discourses concerning
risk. Sex offenders are singled out for special consideration because of the
emotive nature of the crime, particularly where children and the vulnerable
are concerned. Consistent with the broader concerns of criminologists that
expansive forms of state regulation are leading to increasingly volatile,
contradictory and incoherent penal policies (Garland, 1999; O’Malley, 1999;
Crawford, 2001), this article will argue, however, that regulatory activity in
the fields of child protection and sex offender management has resulted in
particularly uncertain, insecure and unsafe policies (Bauman, 1999), predom-
inantly in relation to vetting.
A related area of debate concerns the emergence of a policy of ‘radical
prevention’ (Hebenton and Seddon, 2009: 2) in relation to sex offending.
Scholars have charted the development of the theoretical underpinnings of
criminal justice policy which has shifted ‘From Dangerousness to Risk’
(Castel, 1991) towards a defining contemporary framework based on ‘pre-
cautionary logic’ (Ericson, 2007). This pre-emptive approach to penal policy
is characterized by the quest for security and certainty via the imposition of
reactionary risk-averse policies which seek to govern ‘worst case scenarios’
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and prevent all possible manifestations of future risk before they occur
(Zedner, 2009). Others have noted the significance of the precautionary prin-
ciple in the global response to terrorism post-9–11 (Ignatieff, 2004; Zedner,
2005) and in the American and British response to protecting the public from
known dangerous violent and sexual offenders via, for example, exclusion-
ary measures such as sex offender registration and community notification
and preventive detention (Seddon, 2008; Hebenton and Seddon, 2009). This
article seeks to analyse and refine the implications of these associated debates
within the specific context of pre-employment vetting which attempts to pre-
emptively respond to both known and unknown risks posed by sex offenders.
In recent times we have witnessed ‘the institutionalisation of vetting’
(Furedi and Bristow, 2008: xii) which has further entrenched the rhetoric of
precaution through a chain of legislative and policy proposals, culminating
most recently in the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. It will be
argued, however, that recent measures which attempt to regulate all those
who would work with children or the vulnerable to minimize potential risks
have been implemented and are likely to be played out under conditions of
extreme uncertainty. Pre-emptive measures are premised at best on the claim
that it is possible to largely pre-determine who poses a risk and to what extent
(Zedner, 2009: 35), and at worst, that any levels of uncertainty are justified
by vague claims to potential harms which must be guarded against ‘at all
costs’. This two-fold justification, however, is not sustainable when it comes
to pre-employment vetting and the new legislative framework in particular
where the reality of potential harm is clouded by a perceived and misrepre-
sented ‘risk’. In the main, there are obvious, yet on the whole unacknowl-
edged, limitations of official knowledge about the risks posed by largely
unknown individuals who may have never come to the attention of the
authorities for sexually deviant behaviour. Moreover, the resulting ambigui-
ties concerning levels and types of risk operate at the expense of effective risk
management and to the detriment of relationships between individuals within
civil society.
In effect, in the desire ‘to govern risky conditions’ or behaviours rather than
‘categorically risky types of person’, as O’Malley puts it (2004: 318–19), ‘social
control must be “front loaded”’ (Reichman, 1986: 155). Selective, scientific,
objective risk assessments, as the hallmarks of ‘actuarial justice’ (Feely and
Simon, 1994), are superseded by subjective, sweeping, speculative assump-
tions about risk. This has in turn fostered generalized forms of intrusive risk
regulation as a precaution where knowledge about actual risks and targeted
intervention are replaced by uncertainty (Zedner, 2009: 37). These take the
form of inflating embedded levels of societal suspicion, mistrust and intoler-
ance concerning potential sex offenders, (Furedi and Bristow, 2008), and
resulting indiscriminate strategies which ‘cast the net of suspicion on all’
(Ericson, 2007: 259).
As both Crawford (2006: 471) and Zedner (2009: 56) note, concerns about
the feasibility of ‘responsive regulation’ and the ‘precautionary principle’
respectively have to a large extent been ignored by advocates of these
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approaches. This analysis seeks to remedy this important lacuna by making
explicit the dangers and uncertainties inherent in the state assumption of
precautionary logic within this specific area of criminal law. The corollaries
of state over-extension relate chiefly to unrealistically raising public expec-
tations about the capacity of the state to control risk via punitive regulatory
frameworks, unintended or ambiguous consequences of far-reaching legisla-
tive and policy frameworks, and uneven implementation (Crawford, 2006).
Ultimately, however, in governing under conditions of extreme uncertainty
and in the precautionary approach that this prompts, there is a failure to
address the underlying policy and practical issues and actively manage risk.
The structure of the article will be as follows. In order to fully understand
the new legislative framework, the article first places the 2006 Act in its con-
temporary context. Part I critically examines the social, cultural and political
context in which vetting has developed and the intrinsic politics of popular
and official discourses. Part II outlines some of the key features of the new
legislative framework with a view to highlighting its underlying rationale, the
previous deficiencies in the law which it was designed to address, and the
potentially expansive scope of the new vetting and barring scheme. Finally,
Parts III and IV will draw out some of the principal dangers and uncertain-
ties resulting from state over-extension in this area of law and policy making.
These are grouped chiefly in terms of: (1) ‘the punishment deficit’; (2) un-
intended effects and uneven policy implementation; and (3) ultimately the
failure to manage risk.
PART I: THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT OF VETTING –
THE LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY PROCESS
In recent years, the management of dangerous or ‘risky’ individuals, such as
paedophiles and persistent violent offenders, has generated enormous popular
and official concern. Consistent with broader academic discourses on state
regulation, notions of risk management (Parton et al., 1997; Kemshall and
Maguire, 2001) and, more recently, preventative governance (Ashenden, 2002)
have become the key criteria for the regulation of child (sexual) abuse and the
management of sexual offenders in the community more generally. A specific
focus of recent policy and organizational processes has been the compilation
of ‘knowledge’ about sex offenders and their whereabouts in order to control
risk and increase security (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997).
During the last 10 years or so, the government has come under increasing
pressure to be seen to be actively ‘doing something’ in the face of glaring
media focus and heightened public fears concerning the presence of sex
offenders in the community (Simon, 1998). As Zedner notes, ‘the mentality
of precaution feeds on existing insecurities and gives sway to the exercise of
fevered bureaucratic imagination’ (2009: 58). New state policies in this area
typically follow on from high-profile cases of child abuse and murder. In the
recent context, there have been two distinct yet interrelated ‘moral panics’
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(Cohen, 1972) about sexual offending which require explicit recognition.
One is the scandal of long-term institutional and institutionalized abuse of
children in care in both church and state settings. The other is the paedophilia
‘stranger danger’ phenomenon which occurs on a seemingly random basis.
As a result of a populist approach to criminal justice policy-making (Bottoms,
1995; Johnstone, 2000), a zero-tolerance approach to risk has developed and
a panoply of legislation pertaining to sexual offending has been enacted
within a relatively short period.
A range of measures has been enacted to manage the risk posed by sex
offenders in the community, such as sex offender registration or notification,
risk of sexual harm orders, sexual offences prevention orders, and the recent
offence of ‘meeting a child following sexual grooming’.1 The specific issue of
how to prevent sex offenders from using their employment as a cover to
target and sexually abuse children, however, has perhaps become one of the
most contentious and politicized in the recent popular and official discourses
on sexual offending. Between 1997 and 2006, no fewer than five primary
legislative reforms were introduced to strengthen vetting procedures and to
criminalize those who abuse their position of trust in order to offend against
children.
There are usually two polar responses of the state in recognition of its limi-
tations to control crime: a politics of denial of responsibility for the problem
(Cohen, 2001); and a politics of punishment as demonstrable evidence of its
strength and commitment (Garland, 1996). In relation to the vetting of sex
offenders, although there is some evidence of the former, particularly where
loopholes or weaknesses subsequently emerge in current policies, the state’s
response to the regulation of sex offenders can more clearly be related to the
latter. The issue of ‘Professional Perpetrators’ – sex offenders who use their
employment as a vehicle to abuse – has been the subject of a spate of legis-
lation for more than a decade (Sullivan and Beech, 2002). New forms of state
intervention are often precipitated by scandals in ‘times of crisis’ which tend
to stimulate a bout of regulatory activity in the longer term (Moran, 2003: 28;
Agamben, 2005). Many of the recent measures on vetting were drafted and
implemented quickly as an immediate precautionary response to an emerging
policy crisis.
PUBLIC INQUIRIES
From the early 1990s onwards, a series of public inquiry reports and official
reviews of cases of ‘institutional abuse’ highlighted the link between institu-
tions, such as care homes, and the sexual abuse of children in particular
(Corby et al., 2001; McAlinden, 2006).2 Overall, however, the inquiries have
reiterated recommendations to improve pre-employment screening and
increase levels of child protection, which have not always been acted upon
(Parton, 2004). Several inquiries, for example, have questioned the accuracy
of vetting practices and the consistency with which the various agencies use
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the system. The Warner Inquiry (1992) concluded that 10 per cent of the
heads of care homes and a third of workers were able to take up their posts
without references. Six years later, the Utting Report (1998) also expressed
‘serious concerns about the manner in which police checks were handled’ and
highlighted that insufficient consideration was given to reference procedures.
Most recently, the Bichard Inquiry (2004)3 highlighted serious failings in the
way in which the police managed their intelligence systems. As Sullivan and
Beech (2002) argue, this raises questions not only about the speed and process
of institutional change in this area but also, more crucially, whether any
lessons have actually been learned.
Indeed, the institutional gaze of many of these inquiries and related public
discourses has been too narrow in focus and as such has tended to impede a
meaningful and effective review of policy and procedures.4 In short, the
rather linear focus on accountability and apportioning blame for acts or
omissions within the context of a particular crisis or scandal does not permit
a fuller consideration of the systemic problems of child care institutions or
vetting practices and the wider policy issues concerning sex offender manage-
ment. In relation to child abuse inquiries in particular, it has been demon-
strated that child care institutions are especially self-protective, secretive and
closed by nature (Wescott, 1991: 15–17; Sullivan and Beech, 2002: 162). As
such, they strongly discourage the drawing of attention to any deficiencies
in policies and procedures.5
KEY LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Other recommendations from the official inquiries and reviews eventually
resulted in a concentration of piecemeal legislative developments. These
measures have generally attempted to improve child care practice and to
prevent sex offenders from making contact with children through organiza-
tions. For example, Section 3 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000
made it a specific offence for someone to engage in sexual activity with a
person under 18 if they are in a position of trust in relation to that person.6
Sections 26–38 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 made it
an offence for convicted abusers to seek employment with children or for
employers to knowingly appoint such people. The majority of the recent
measures, however, are based around pre-employment vetting. Part V of the
Police Act 1997 established the Criminal Records Bureau, set up in 2002, to
co-ordinate criminal record checks. The Protection of Children Act 1999
combined the Consultancy Service Index and ‘List 99’ to make it easier for
employers to check whether applicants who wish to work with children are
known or suspected abusers.
Such an ad hoc style of state regulation means that ever-expanding modes
of vetting are enacted ostensibly as a ‘quick-fix solution’ to simply cover up
perceived cracks and failures in the regulatory framework as they emerge.
This well-established approach to penal policy continues to mask problems
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inherent in the regulatory framework and in the practice of vetting in partic-
ular. In the main, there is an apparent state and public over-reliance on vetting
in order to increase society’s feelings of safety and security. However, it is
argued that in such a frenzied approach to law making, state regulation of
pre-employment screening in order to expand control and pre-emptively
address potential risks may actually end up exacerbating the problem.
PART II: THE SAFEGUARDING VULNERABLE GROUPS ACT 2006
The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 is the most recent in a long
line of legislative measures on pre-employment vetting. The new scheme has
been operational since October 2009, with transitory provisions in place in
the interim.7 The Act introduces a new statutory framework and gives
legislative effect to many of the recommendations of the Bichard Inquiry
(Gillespie, 2007). It recommended, inter alia, the introduction of a national
registration system for those deemed suitable to work with children and
improved information sharing between agencies (Bichard, 2004: 13–17).
The new vetting and barring scheme resembles a form of state-licensing of
those permitted to engage in certain routine activities with children or the
vulnerable. The Act is centrally concerned with two broad categories of
activity, termed ‘regulated activities’ and ‘controlled activities’. The former
covers forms of close contact work with children such as work in schools
and care settings and managerial positions where there are key responsibili-
ties. The latter covers ancillary work in education and health settings, such
as cleaning or catering, and administrative work involving access to sensitive
information about these protected groups. A person who fails to undergo
the requisite Criminal Records Bureau checks and get on the register will be
guilty of a criminal offence if they work with children or vulnerable adults.
It is an offence for a barred person to seek to, offer to, or engage in a regu-
lated activity. Moreover, employers can also be liable for either using a barred
person or for failing to vet their employees. It is proposed to outline the key
features of the new statutory framework together with the perceived failings
of the previous regulatory scheme which they were designed to address.
THE VETTING PROCESS
Vetting involves a series of different background checks to enable employers
to safeguard against employing a barred or restricted person via a two-stage
process. Before the adoption of the current statutory framework, the first
stage was essentially comprised of a check against three distinct lists of
known offenders which were compiled according to different criteria. First,
‘List 99’ (maintained under section 142 of the Education Act 2002 by the
Department of Education and Employment) contained details of people
either barred or restricted from working in schools on the grounds not only
MCALINDEN: VETTING SEXUAL OFFENDERS 31
 at Queens University on April 10, 2010 http://sls.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
of misconduct but also on medical grounds. For those with convictions for
40 of the most serious offences, inclusion on this list was automatic. For all
other cases, including cautions, the decisions were based on ministerial discre-
tion. Secondly, the ‘Protection of Vulnerable Adults Scheme’ (introduced by
Part 7 of the Care Standards Act 2000 and maintained by the Department of
Health) covered those banned from working in care homes and domiciliary
agencies in England and Wales having previously harmed vulnerable adults
in their care. Thirdly, the ‘Protection of Children Act List’ (introduced under
the Protection of Children Act 1999) combined the Department of Health
Consultancy Service Index, which set out the names of previous child care
workers about whom concerns exist around their suitability to work with
children, and ‘List 99’. The second stage was disclosure following a criminal
records check of police files.8
A further supposed layer of ‘checks’, albeit not strictly conceptualized in
pre-employment terms, was the sex offenders register, originally provided
for by Part I of the Sex Offenders Act 1997, and subsequently re-enacted by
Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. ‘The register’, or notification schemes
as they are more properly known, requires certain classes of sex offenders to
register their details with the police. Since 2005, this information has been
held on ViSOR (the Violent and Sex Offender Register) – a central search-
able nationwide database of detailed information on known sexual and
violent offenders, linked to the Police National Computer.9
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE VETTING PROCESS
Before the reformulation of the current statutory framework there were prac-
tical problems with the vetting process in general, and with the operation of
the key List 99 in particular. The latter was much wider than just sexual
offences and covered those convicted of crimes such as deception offences.
Somewhat confusingly, no details of the misconduct were provided (Depart-
ment of Education and Employment, 1995: para. 52) and given the breadth
of its scope, it was of little practical utility since obviously not all those on
this list necessarily posed a danger to children. The nature of the discre-
tionary decision led to anomalies and inconsistencies and effectively meant
that in some cases an individual was not on List 99, despite being on the sex
offenders register. This was mainly attributable to the fact that cautions have
historically been treated as different from convictions for vetting purposes,
even though they both represent a legal statement of guilt (Gillespie, 2006).10
The process of pre-employment vetting as a whole, therefore, was at best
confusing and cumbersome as to which ‘list’ or procedure to follow. There
was a lack of coherence in particular between List 99 and the other lists held
nationally. Procedures were also characterized by a lack of clarity about indi-
vidual roles in the vetting process and who bore responsibility for doing
what.11 At worst, as recent cases demonstrate, these difficulties led to some
high-risk individuals slipping through the net.
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ADDRESSING THE DEFICIENCIES OF PREVIOUS REGULATORY SCHEMES
Many of these problems were addressed in part by the Safeguarding Vulner-
able Groups Act 2006. First, the three separate lists of barred individuals,
outlined above, were to be streamlined. The Act establishes a centralized
online register and continuous criminal records monitoring of every person
who works or volunteers with children or vulnerable adults, to be held in two
separate but aligned lists. Second, inclusion on one or both lists would be
automatic following a caution or conviction for certain offences but may also
be considered when specified behaviour harms a child or vulnerable adult or
where evidence suggests risk of harm. Third, an Independent Safeguarding
Authority was created, referred to as the Independent Barring Board in the
Act, as a statutory body to maintain the lists. This new body will remove pre-
vious ministerial decision-making and take all decisions concerning whether
an individual is suitable to work with children on a case-by-case basis.
Simplification of the vetting process represents a positive attempt to
strengthen and improve pre-employment checks and child protection proce-
dures. Other vestiges of the old regime remain, however, particularly in
relation to the uncertainties surrounding the role of individual state agencies
and related concerns about information sharing. Operational difficulties are
also likely to occur, especially with regard to the significant expansion of
vetting into the private sphere. The scope of the new scheme will extend far
beyond the traditional education and health care settings to encompass all
those who may have contact with children or access to information about
them. There are concerns in particular about the nature of system controls
on the release of sensitive information about sex offenders and the related
consequences of community notification. Indeed, the central argument of
this article, as stated at the outset, is that this over-encroachment of the state
in the form of ever-expanding precautionary modes of social regulation
produces a myriad of uncertainties in the form of raised public expectations,
unintended and ambiguous policy consequences and, in due course the
undermining of their core aim of effective risk management.
PART III: ‘POPULIST PUNITIVENESS’ AND THE ‘PUNISHMENT DEFICIT’
As noted above, over the last few years, the state has introduced ever more
stringent penal policies in direct response to public fears and insecurities
concerning the presence of sex offenders in the community. The state has
fuelled ‘the politics of culture and fear’ (Furedi, 2006a, 2006b) surrounding
sex offenders via criminalization and reactive and pre-emptive policing of the
potential risks posed by sex offenders. This populist approach to penal
policy, however, at once fosters misplaced public perceptions about the risks
posed by sex offenders and the ability of the state to curb them.
In January 2006, while the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act was still
being drafted, there was widespread media and public concern after a number
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of offenders on the sex offenders register were approved to work within
schools.12 It became clear that gaps in the current framework remained,
chiefly because many of Bichard’s recommendations had yet to be imple-
mented.13 These cases prompted a further review of current systems for the
vetting of teachers and other individuals who work with children, including
the sex offenders register and List 99, as a follow-up to the recommendations
of the Bichard inquiry (Gillespie, 2007). In response to these concerns, the
then Education Secretary Ruth Kelly overturned previous advice by affirm-
ing that teachers must apply for a fresh background check each time they
took up a new post within their local education authority.14
In February 2008, the Home Secretary announced the piloting of a new
disclosure scheme to allow parents, and single mothers in particular, to check
whether people who have unsupervised contact with their children have
convictions for sexual offending.15 This could include, for example, the screen-
ing of new partners of the child’s parents or friends or neighbours looking
after children. This policy proposal was in direct response to the media and
public campaign for a ‘Sarah’s Law’, following the kidnapping and murder
of eight-year-old Sarah Payne by known paedophile Roy Whiting in July
2000 (Ashenden, 2002; Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 146–66).16 A limited
form of disclosure already exists under the Multi-Agency Public Protection
arrangements, where there is an immediate danger to the public (Kemshall
and Maguire, 2003).17 Until this point, however, the government had firmly
rejected calls for community notification along the lines of ‘Megan’s Law’ in
the United States, which permits a much wider degree of public disclosure
of information about local sex offenders (Rutherford, 2000; Thomas, 2003).
Now it seems that, despite official reassurances to the contrary, we have
moved one step closer to a general right of access to such information. Follow-
ing the outcome of the four pilot schemes, new legislation is possible repre-
senting a complete u-turn in government policy from the previous reluctance
to legislate in this area (Thomas, 2001). This announcement further conveys
the trend towards populist decision-making. Moreover, as will be argued
further below, widespread community notification of the identity of known
sex offenders blurs the distinction between the uses of information for public
or private purposes and also has wider ramifications for the effective manage-
ment of risk.
This reactionary form of policy making, symptomatic of law making in
other overtly politicized and contentious arenas such as the anti-terrorism
legislation (Zedner, 2005), is problematic on several fronts. It not only creates
fear about the perceived omnipresence of sex offenders in society but it also
succeeds in conflating levels and types of risk in the public imagination. That
is, sex offending against children tends to be equated with sex offending in
general and all sex offenders are deemed to pose the same degree of very high
risk. Moreover, this populist punitive approach of New Labour to ‘law and
order’ is circuitous and ultimately sustains a vicious policy cycle (McAlinden,
2007: 27).18 That is to say, a broadly punitive socio-political rhetoric simul-
taneously fuels public fear of sexual offenders and provides a rationale and
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increased demand for regulatory measures meant to allay these fears. As
Furedi and Bristow put it ‘vetting begets vetting’ (2008: 5). This in turn,
however, has ultimately promulgated a broader problem in terms of a
‘punishment deficit’ (Brownlee, 1998). Vetting in particular creates a false
sense of security that it is possible through the imposition of these regula-
tory measures to prevent an individual from ever harming children in their
care (Furedi and Bristow, 2008: 6–7).
The reality is, however, that all such measures are severely limited in their
ability to effectively manage the risk posed by sex offenders. It is axiomatic
that regulatory legal frameworks, which are heavily premised on the effec-
tive use of information, can only ever hope to deal effectively with ‘known’
risks, that is, those sex offenders who have already come to the attention of
law enforcement agencies in some way. In practice, this actually covers very
few offenders since it is well established that the majority of abuse, and there-
fore prospective risks to children, remain hidden and undisclosed.19
PART IV: THE UNINTENDED AND AMBIGUOUS POLICY
CONSEQUENCES OF STATE OVER-EXTENSION
The recent expansion of the regulatory framework on vetting with respect
to the screening of all those who would work with children or the vulner-
able in order to pre-emptively address probable risks creates insecurities and
ambiguities of sizeable proportions. These may be related to the negative and
unintended policy consequences in terms of the potential public release of
information about sex offenders and the ambiguous and uneven implemen-
tation of policies at a localized level.
NEGATIVE AND UNINTENDED POLICY CONSEQUENCES:
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION
Making the identities of known sex offenders public information, as these
measures have the potential to do, may have a number of consequences for
the wider management of the sex offender problem. The paradox here is that
public information about sex offenders in one sense makes society feel safer
or better protected but, at the same time, may actually drive offenders under-
ground and consequently make them more dangerous. The scope of the new
regulatory framework on vetting may have a negative and detrimental impact
on how sex offenders are perceived by the wider public and ultimately their
reintegration. The public shaming of a person as a sex offender may perpetu-
ate a cycle of stigmatization, ostracism and ultimately re-offending behaviour
(Edwards and Hensley, 2001; McAlinden, 2005). The pilot schemes to allow
parents to check the criminal records of those with unsupervised contact with
their children, referred to above, are tantamount to community notification
and may compound these problems. In essence, a system designed for the
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needs of employers is being adapted for private relationships without any
real thought about structural constraints or quality control. This ultimately
blurs the distinction between the public and private sphere.
The development of the regulatory state has entailed a move away from old
modes of governance based on hierarchal and bureaucratic control towards
new styles comprised of decentred regulation involving both state and non-
state actors co-operating through shared networks and alliances (Crawford,
2006: 450). This notion of ‘networked’ or ‘nodal’ governance (Shearing and
Wood, 2003) has meant that civil society often works in partnership with the
state in the local governance of crime (Crawford, 1997, 2003; McEvoy and
Eriksson, 2008). A recent example of this in the specific terrain of sexual
offending is the development of ‘reintegrative shaming’ programmes with
high-risk sex offenders, such as Circles of Support and Accountability, first
developed in Canada and then piloted in England and Wales and elsewhere
(McAlinden, 2005, 2007). Early evaluations of these projects in England and
Wales have shown that such programmes have been effective in assisting in
offender rehabilitation and that, despite tentative beginnings, communities
were willing to play a constructive and supportive role in this process (Quaker
Peace and Social Witness, 2005).
At one level, making the community part of the regulatory process and
admitting the public as consumers of such knowledge about offenders may
help to reduce risks and make communities safer. This ‘opening up’ of
knowledge is particularly important in relation to ‘grooming’ where many
sex offenders seek to infiltrate unsuspecting families or communities
(McAlinden, 2006: 355). Legal interventions can do little to prevent this
unless the offender has already come to their attention; communities can,
however, by arranging networks of support and control where necessary
(McAlinden, 2005: 388).
On another level, making individuals aware of the identity and whereabouts
of a known or suspected sex offender in such a formal way may make matters
worse (Berliner, 1996; Soothill and Francis, 1998). The aftermath of the News
of the World’s ‘Name and Shame’ Campaign, referred to above, demonstrated
the potential for violence and vigilante activity surrounding public informa-
tion about sex offenders (Ashenden, 2002; Williams and Thompson, 2004a,
2004b). As a result of the campaign, for example, one convicted paedophile
disappeared, two suspected paedophiles committed suicide, and one woman’s
home was targeted simply because she had the same surname as a known
sexual offender. The precautionary approach to criminal justice as evidenced
through vetting can, therefore, generate ‘fear and with it intolerance’ (Ericson,
2007: 155), suspicion and exclusion of deviants from the local community.
AMBIGUOUS AND UNEVEN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
National state policies on vetting may be modified when they are received at
a localized level as they are ‘refashioned’ and ‘resisted’ through ‘distinct insti-
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tutional cultures and traditions and divergent penal narratives’ (Crawford,
2006: 451). This may result in uneven and incongruous implementation of
penal policies and practices. This broad argument has resonance on at least
three distinct yet related levels: how state policies may be implemented and
received between various local agencies who work on a co-operative basis;
how policies may operate within a given institution or organization; and
finally how policies may work on a transnational level among national
authorities.
First, as regards the inter-agency context, all work in relation to sex offend-
ers in the United Kingdom currently takes places on a multi-agency basis
with the core goal of public protection (Kemshall and Maguire, 2001). The
problematic nature of ‘partnership’ approaches to crime problems in terms
of the potentially competing organizational cultures and working practices
are well documented (Crawford, 1997; Kemshall and Maguire, 2001). Central
to an analysis of inter-agency co-operation are differing institutional and struc-
tural power relations which exist between agencies and are incorporated into
multi-agency work (Crawford, 1997: 127–31; Pearson et al., 1992; Crawford
and Jones, 1995). Power differentials may especially influence other sympto-
matic forms of inter-agency conflict, such as struggles over confidentiality
and privileged access to information (Sampson et al., 1991: 132). As regards
the vetting process, the most pertinent problems are likely to relate to infor-
mation sharing and a shared understanding of which particular agency is
responsible for what. In short, differences in approach to the problem of the
risks posed by child sex offenders may result in fragmented working prac-
tices and in a breakdown of effective communication of important informa-
tion about offenders.
Indeed, inadequate information recording and sharing lay at the heart of
the Ian Huntley case. ‘Systemic and corporate’ failures in police handling of
intelligence and in the vetting and barring systems were blamed for Huntley
being cleared to work in Soham primary school (Bichard, 2004: 2, para. 8).
As noted above, the 2006 Act, as the legislative basis for the implementation
of the Bichard Report, attempts to unite previously disparate sources of
criminal records information. However, since the success of vetting by its
nature relies almost entirely on the effective use of accurate information, it is
argued that some problems are likely to be endemic. Huntley’s date of birth
and a number of aliases were not properly recorded or checked on police
files. This led to information being missed when the call for a background
check came. In addition, as will be argued further below, difficulties also
remain in relation to how ‘soft’ intelligence or ‘suspect’ offenders are to be
treated for the purposes of the vetting system. Following the Soham murders
it later emerged that Huntley was known to police forces for a series of
previous allegations of sexual offending where no action was eventually taken.
Police forces failed to pass on details about his offending past largely because
relevant information had been deleted. Despite the new reforms, much will
depend, therefore, on the actions of the police in keeping information and
intelligence timely, accurate and up to date.
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On a second level, sociologists have for some time sought to develop an
‘institutional epistemology’ (Garland and Sparks, 2000: 201) which acknow-
ledges the cognitive processes and the internal relational dynamics of institu-
tions.20 Whatever the general mandate promulgated by the state, institutions
in themselves are apt to develop and re-organize their own rationale as the
basis for collective action which is shaped by a ‘sameness’ of shared thoughts,
values and information (Douglas, 1986: 53). Moreover, the institutional enter-
prise is embedded with wider forms of social interaction which produce
informal norms as well as more formal organizational rules and monitor
compliance with them. These systems of rules may either constrain or
encourage innovative individual action (Nee and Brinton, 2001: xvi).
This analysis of institutional cultures not only has a bearing on the process
of institutional change, but also has implications for the effectiveness of legal
frameworks on vetting. That is, the ultimate success of the new vetting
measures as the gatekeepers of access to institutions by would-be abusers may
also depend greatly on how rules and regulations are received and negotiated
within institutions at an individualized localized level. It also helps to explain
the slow progress of organizational change in failing to implement the same
key recommendations from a series of inquiry reports and reviews which
would improve policy, practices and procedures on vetting.
Thirdly, although the precautionary principle also has resonance in the
context of policy formation at an EU level (Fisher, 2002), differences in penal
cultures and political economies may mean that its effects are diluted to
varying degrees in practice (Sparks, 2001). Moreover, the problems of policy
implementation within inter-organizational contexts are likely to be com-
pounded when it comes to multi-agency working across jurisdictional bound-
aries. In addition to the obvious difficulties concerning translating legal
frameworks across cultural and language barriers, criminal records informa-
tion may be very difficult and time consuming to obtain from some states who
may be reluctant to release information (Magee, 2008). The EU White Paper
proposal for the establishment of a European index of offenders was rejected
(Council of Ministers, 2005). Enhancing police and judicial co-operation and
enforcement in criminal matters, however, is an issue of ongoing concern
(Ramage, 2007) with a move towards the creation of a European criminal
record. This will eventually improve the availability and quality of informa-
tion about offenders (Constantin, 2008; Jacobs and Blitsa, 2008).
In the interim, there are varying systems across the EU and disparity
within and between countries in terms of standardized criminal record infor-
mation and data storage systems, and arrangements to track sex offenders and
prevent unsuitable people from working with children. Such concerns are
becoming increasingly pertinent given the significant cross-border movement
of individuals within the EU.21 Recent NSPCC research has highlighted the
array of approaches to pre-employment vetting within individual countries
which presents significant challenges to inter-country co-operation and
exchange of relevant information about offenders (Fitch et al., 2007: 2). For
example, while the UK has recently extended vetting to all posts involving
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access to children or the vulnerable, in Sweden health sector workers are
not vetted, and in Poland most can work in children’s homes without pre-
employment checks.22 These differences inevitably mean not only that vital
information about perceived risk may be lost, but also that individuals will
likely exploit differences between countries and seek employment in other
jurisdictions where vetting and barring systems are not as stringent.23
PART V: THE FAILURE TO MANAGE RISK
As noted above, the new legislative framework goes beyond ‘the merely
suspicious’ (Ericson, 2007: 1) to effectively criminalize all those who not only
have direct contact with children or the vulnerable but also those with
indirect contact in the form of information about them. As Ashworth has
argued, ‘seemingly objective criteria such as harm and offence tend to melt
into the political ideologies of the time’ (2003: 55). This ‘penal imprint of the
panopticon’ (Ericson, 2007: 27) represents significant net-widening which
goes well beyond those who would pose a danger to children and has huge
resource implications for the management of risk.
Research has demonstrated the staggering costs and wider resource impli-
cations of the recent ‘boom’ in vetting (Appleton, 2006: 6–7). The govern-
ment, it seems, gravely underestimated the potential demand for criminal
records checks and the Criminal Records Bureau was under-resourced from
its inception (Gillespie, 2006: 26). It has been estimated that the Safeguarding
Vulnerable Groups Act will increase figures further and mean that as many
as one-third of the adult working population in England and Wales, approxi-
mately 9.5 million adults, will be subject to ongoing criminal records checks.24
The disclosure process costs around £83 million annually (Peck and Keter,
2006: 40). It has been estimated that the new vetting and barring scheme will
have additional set-up costs of £16.6 million and annual running costs of
between £12 and £15 million (Peck and Keter, 2006: 40). There are simply too
many people involved, therefore, for these measures to be realistic policing
options. This will, as a result, divert valuable time, resources and focus from
the real risks and problems. As Hebenton and Seddon (2009: 12) note, quoting
Sunstein (2002), this is indicative of the ‘risk-risk’ problem of the precaution-
ary approach where enhanced focus on managing or reducing one set of risks
can create increased risks elsewhere.
The success of vetting as a preventative measure, in common with the sex
offenders register, is based on the notion that simply having a list of known
‘risky’ individuals will make children or the vulnerable safe. These measures,
however, are based on illusory fears and risks and not real tangible risk assess-
ments. Apart from the limitations of record keeping and information systems,
vetting only takes account of past actions based on a known record of offend-
ing and cannot predict how someone with no record will behave in the future
(Furedi and Bristow, 2008: 7). It is well documented, however, that a high
proportion of sexual offenders have never come to the attention of the police
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or other criminal justice agencies.25 Moreover, reconviction rates for sex
offenders are generally low, as little as 10 per cent over a six-year follow-up
period (Hood et al., 2002), in comparison with other classes of offender.26 As
such, a regulatory vetting framework can only ever have a limited impact on
managing the overall risk presented by sex offenders.
Precautionary approaches to vetting are heavily premised on the notion of
the omnipresent dangerous sex offender who poses a very high level of risk.
Public concern about the risks posed by sex offenders, however, often out-
weighs the actual levels of danger. In this respect, a recent body of work by
Soothill and colleagues has identified three typologies of sex offender risk:
‘known and high risk’; ‘known, but low risk’; and ‘unknown risk’ (Kirby et
al., 2005; Soothill et al., 2005). This categorization of offenders has important
implications for quantifying ‘unknown risks’ and for evaluating the likely
success of vetting measures. This research estimates that of sexual recidivists
known to the police, under one-third will come from convicted offenders in
the high-risk category. Approximately another third will come from convicted
offenders in low-/medium-risk categories. It is the third category of offender,
however, – ‘unknown risk’ – which presents most problems.
Kirby et al. (2005) have identified an important subset of this latter category
which they term those ‘strongly suspected of serious sex crime and future
danger’. These are what Zedner, adopting the terminology of former US
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, calls ‘known unknowns’ (2009: 47)
– those sex offenders ‘we know we don’t know about’. This would cover
those individuals thought to be offenders by the police, such as Ian Huntley,
who have not actually been apprehended or adjudicated upon. Kirby et al.’s
(2005) 15-year follow-up study compared child sex offenders who were
convicted with those who were suspected but not convicted in the Lancashire
police force area over a three-year period in the late 1980s. The results show
that suspected sex offenders provide a substantial source of future harm, and
also accounted for one-third of repeat offenders coming to police attention.
These offenders are normally outside the remit of traditional regulatory
measures which are concentrated predominantly on monitoring convicted or
cautioned sex offenders. This category of ‘unknown’ or ‘suspected risk’ can
essentially only be probed, using traditional methods, by improving the
mechanisms for securing convictions, such as increased intelligence, inves-
tigation and surveillance. As regards suspected offenders, however, as Kirby
et al. readily acknowledge, ‘There are considerable operational and ethical
concerns to confront in dealing with such situations’ (p. 226). Moreover, to
proceed further in this vein with suspect offenders would increase the
frequency and amount of pre-emptive regulatory activity by the state with
further resource implications.
In addition, far more significant are the category of ‘unknown unknowns’
(Zedner, 2009: 47) – those sex offenders ‘we don’t know we don’t know
about’. This covers all those potential offenders who may never have come to
notice. To compensate for a lack of knowledge about the potential risks posed
by this group, the state dispenses with measures selectively and individually
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tailored to assess risk for particular individuals for undifferentiated strategies
which ‘treat all as potential suspects’ (Zedner, 2009: 47). This blanket
approach to risk, instilled in the recent expansive measures on vetting, merely
perpetuates public fears and anxieties concerning the pervasiveness of sexual
offending against children in particular. The resulting feelings of insecurity,
suspicion and mistrust which attach to all who come into contact with our
children undermines our ability to make discerning judgements about the
likelihood of harm. This may ultimately help to further mask ‘unknown risks’
until they manifest themselves in the form of actual harm to children or the
vulnerable.
CONCLUSION
One of the most pressing societal challenges is how to identify those who
threaten children, on a proactive basis, prior to the occurrence of actual harm
(Room, 2004b). It is a given that no system can eliminate risk entirely or
protect children from the infrequent and unusual. In the face of this stark
fact, we have witnessed what Ericson (2007: 669) calls the ‘criminalisation of
uncertainty’ where in response to limited knowledge about actual risks or
harms, the state responds with further legislation, surveillance and punish-
ment of the offender. There is a danger, however, that this well established
pattern of the enactment of new and increasing forms of state regulation, often
as a direct response to high profile cases, has impeded a meaningful consider-
ation of the broader policy and practical issues which underlie vetting and
risk management processes. In this respect, the real lessons of public inquiries
such as Soham have been framed in terms of bad management, lack of training
and inadequate resources (Room, 2004a), particularly in relation to informa-
tion sharing.
Aside from the obvious deficiencies of recent measures in practical terms,
there are also broader implications which relate to the dangers inherent in
law and policy-making in response to public clamours to tragic but unusual
incidents. In short, particularly heinous crimes which occur infrequently
become the focus of both popular and official discourses and are usually
presented as a damning indictment of the system as a whole. Risk as the basis
of precautionary crime control policy is often based on subjective populist
value assumptions rather than objective scientific calculations. The potential
implications for civil liberties, however, which underline recent pre-emptive
approaches to the risk posed by sex offenders, are invariably justified by
appeals to potential harm (Zedner, 2005, 2009).
There is a wider ‘politics and culture of fear’ (Furedi, 2006a, 2006b) in
contemporary society which relates to potential risks to public safety posed
by a range of threats, including terrorism, stranger danger and abuse, and the
need to take ever more stringent precautionary measures against them. It is
this politics of culture and fear surrounding sexual offending, created in large
part by the media and sustained in turn by public and official responses,
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which fuels the regulatory regime. As Furedi (2006b) argues, however, the
facts often fail to support the scare stories about new risks to our health and
safety. The upshot is that the public and official obsession with theoretical
or potential risks posed by sex offenders may actually distract society from
the real risks or harms.
Vetting gives the ‘allure of protection’ (Hebenton and Seddon, 2009: 12)
or the impression rather than the substance of security (Furedi and Bristow,
2008: 7). The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act as the most recent mani-
festation of burgeoning state regulation of the pre-employment context has
merely further cemented the systemic flaws and innate dangers of barring
and vetting systems (Room, 2004a). In short, the crux of the problem is that
the recent pre-emptive and insidious measures on vetting present significant
challenges to precautionary, regulatory frameworks by seeking to govern the
ungovernable – that is they are limited inexorably to known, identifiable and
preventable risks and not the unknown, hidden and therefore the most
dangerous ones.
NOTES
I would like to thank Professors Kieran McEvoy and Phil Scraton for their insight-
ful comments on earlier drafts of the article.
1. Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 established a notification scheme and
related orders, and section 15, the ‘grooming offence’. This Act amended and
replaced the previous law in relation to sex offender registration and related
measures.
2. The inquiries have included the Ty Mawr Inquiry following allegations of
misconduct in Gwent children’s homes (Williams and McCreadie, 1992); and
the Waterhouse Report (2000) of the inquiry into the abuse of children in care
homes in North Wales. The reviews have included the Warner Report (1992)
on the selection, development and management of staff in children’s homes; and
the Utting Report (1998) on the safeguards for children living away from home.
3. The Inquiry was set up following the trial and conviction of Ian Huntley for
the murders of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in Soham in 2002. It examined
child protection procedures in two police constabularies in England and Wales
and in particular the effectiveness of information sharing systems and vetting
practices.
4. Academic discourses have inclined towards a cynical view of the inquiry pro-
cess arguing that official discourses may be socially and politically constructed
(Rolston and Scraton, 2005).
5. Several studies and inquiries, for example, have established that staff either
ignored signs of abuse or failed to act upon disclosures by children as an
attempt to preserve the reputation of the institution or disguise the lack of
proper procedures in place (Dawson, 1983; Waterhouse, 2000).
6. This offence has now been extended by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss. 16–24.
7. The Act applies in England and Wales and in part to Northern Ireland, with
the remainder to be implemented by an Order in Council. A similar framework
was introduced in Scotland under the Protecting Vulnerable Groups (Scotland)
Act 2006.
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8. There are two types of disclosure: standard disclosure, which provides details
of current and spent convictions, cautions, reprimands and warnings held on
the Police National Computer (s. 113, Police Act 1997); and enhanced disclo-
sure for those regularly involved in working with children or vulnerable adults,
which also includes any relevant information held on local police files (s.115,
Police Act 1997).
9. This scheme was heralded as a major step forward in crime prevention. See,
e.g., ‘Offender Database to Cut Crime’, BBC News Online, 19 August 2005,
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4163764.stm
10. See also R. Kelly, Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 441, cols. 968–969, 19 January
2006.
11. See previous note.
12 ‘This Child Sex Offender Was Given Teaching Jobs in Three Schools’, Daily
Mail, 14 January 2006; ‘7 Perv Teachers . . . 1 Dunce Minister’, The Sun, 16
January 2006. In one of the first cases, a Norwich teacher, who had been
cautioned for accessing indecent images of children on the internet (contrary
to s. 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978), was placed on the sex offend-
ers register but not List 99 because a junior education minister had determined
that the evidence against him was ‘inconclusive’.
13 ‘Changes After Soham “Fall short”’, BBC News Online, 15 March 2006, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4349135.stm. Indeed, it has since emerged that
several of these recommendations remain unimplemented as of July 2008
(Magee, 2008).
14. See note 10 above.
15. ‘It’s Victory for Sara: Government to Pilot Sarah’s Law’, News of the World,
17 February 2008; ‘Parents Get New Sex Crime Checks’, BBC News Online, 17
February 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7249043.stm
16. The campaign was led by Sarah’s mother, Sara Payne, and backed by the News
of the World newspaper’s ‘Name and Shame’ campaign which called for the
authorities to publicly identify all known sex offenders.
17. In R v Chief Constable of North Wales Police, ex parte Thorpe [1999] QB 396,
the Court of Appeal affirmed that although there should never be a policy of
blanket disclosure, the police had a right to notify immediate neighbours that
two individuals had moved into a caravan park with a criminal record of child
abuse since there was a specific risk of re-offending.
18. It has also been argued, however, that there has been an exaggerated focus on
punitiveness in recent times, since the use of punitive sanctions has historically
been an endemic feature of the criminal justice system (see Matthews, 2005).
19. Research shows, for example, that fewer than 5 per cent of sex offenders are
ever apprehended (Salter, 2003) and that only 12 per cent of rapes involving
children (Smith et al., 2000) are ever reported to the police.
20. Emile Durkheim (1958) first conceptualized the ‘science of institutions’ and the
notion of institutions as individuals.
21. Figures from May 2004, for example, show that 17,013 nationals came to the
UK from the 10 new EU member states and applied to the Home Office
Worker Registration Scheme to work with children or vulnerable adults (see
Fitch et al., 2007: 2). These figures do not include the self-employed or those
who have failed to register.
22. Other examples include the fact that while criminal records are kept indefinitely
in Northern Ireland, they are deleted in Germany when the person reaches age
24 and are ‘wiped clean’ in Sweden after 10 years if no subsequent offences are
committed (Fitch et al., 2007).
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23. Similar concerns were also raised in the later stages of the parliamentary debates
on the 2006 Act. See, e.g., Baroness Walmsley, Hansard, HL Debs, 1 November
2008, Cols. 370–1; Baroness Morris of Bolton, Hansard, HL Debs, 6 Nov-
ember 2008, Cols. 357–8.
24. Department for Children, Schools and Families, ‘Vetting and Barring Scheme,
Policy Briefing Pack’, at http://www.everychildmatters.gov.uk/_files/2A9855
E1E34B0A4DC734E84D0A1156E9.pdf
25. See note 19 above.
26. This is subject to the caveat that reconviction rates may not always provide an
accurate picture of sexual recidivism rates (Friendship et al., 2002), which may
be as much as 5.3 times the official reconviction rate (Falshaw et al., 2003).
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